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THE MAN IN THE MIRROR 
David A. Logan* 
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION. By Richard A. Posner. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press. 1990. Pp. vi, 156. $18.95. 
A book often tells you as much about its author as it does about its 
subject. No better proof for this proposition can be found than Rich-
ard Posner's Cardozo: A Study in Reputation. 
In the course of considering why Cardozo remains a giant of the 
law more than three score years after his death, Posner offers some 
useful insights into the nature of reputation, jurisprudence, and rheto-
ric. But far more interesting is the light that Cardozo sheds on Posner 
himself. Now into his second decade on the federal bench, Posner has 
changed from a dogmatic academic champion oflaw and economics to 
a pragmatic judge, concerned with morals and rhetoric; in short, a 
judge much like the revered Cardozo. That this change has occurred 
is clear. Less certain are the reasons for it, but Posner's study of Car-
dozo's career provides important clues as to why he has embarked on 
such a fascinating personal and professional odyssey. In the end, I am 
convinced that Posner's evolution is genuine, if to a degree tactically 
motivated. Ifhe is to be considered his generation's Cardozo, a slavish 
adherence to law and economics just would not do, and a more flexible 
jurisprudence and humane rhetoric had to be developed; exit Posner 
the economist, enter Posner the pragmatist. 
I. THE MIRROR 
Benjamin Cardozo is famous. Richard Posner tells us why in Car-
dozo: A Study in Reputation, a work based on Posner's Cooley Lec-
tures at the University of Michigan Law School. According to Posner, 
Cardozo is the first "full-length critical (not biographical) judicial 
study, employing tools of social science as well as oflegal doctrine" (p. 
viii). It also is the first monograph-length study of an individual judge 
that aspires to be "evaluative," "critical not pious," and "systematic, 
nonpolitical, and nonpolemical" (p. viii). After briefly summarizing 
Cardozo's life, 1 Posner turns to Cardozo's reputation, observing that 
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. B.A. 1971, Bucknell University; M.A. 1972, 
Wisconsin; J.D. 1977, University of Virginia. - Ed. Many thanks to Miles Foy, Mike Gerhardt, 
Wayne Logan, John Noyes, Alan Palmiter, Charity Scott, Jeanne Wine, and Ron Wright for 
their comments on an earlier draft and to Marion Benfield, Bill Kaplin, Joel Newman, and Wil-
son Parker for discussing Posner and Cardozo with me. 
l. Pp. 1-6. Cardozo was born into and shaped by the values of a close-knit Sephardic Jewish 
community in New York City. His father was a trial judge who resigned from the bench in 
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while Cardozo generally is placed in the "highest rank" of American 
judges, there is a written and oral tradition that dissents from this 
view.2 Jerome Frank was harshly critical of Cardozo's writing style, 
describing it as having an "alien grace,"3 and Grant Gilmore criticized 
both the style and substance of Cardozo's work.4 Other critics point 
out that Cardozo was able to decide a case in an innovative way and 
yet make the outcome appear unexceptionable and, indeed, inevitable, 
resulting in the lingering image of a "tricky guy."5 Posner concludes 
that these unflattering evaluations are inconsistent with his sense that 
Cardozo has a generally sound reputation; "[t]here is a mystery here 
which the subsequent chapters will try to unravel" (p. 19). 
Posner first attempts to define what constitutes a good reputation. 
He concludes that it is the "practical[] equivalent" of fame: to be 
"widely regarded in a good light" (p. 58). But, as Posner recognizes, 
good reputation may not always be the same as merit, and in any 
event, the conclusion that someone has a good reputation must be 
scrutinized in "the present age of relativism" (p. 58). Reputation is 
"conferred by the people doing the reputing rather than produced by 
the reputed one - and is conferred for their purposes, not his" (p. 59). 
Posner further observes that posthumous reputation is facilitated by 
response to allegations of impropriety arising out of his Tweed Ring connections. Cardozo never 
married and remained closest to his (also unmarried) older sister, Nell. He was tutored at home 
by the writer Horatio Alger and graduated from Columbia College at 19, having studied the 
humanities with an emphasis on philosophy. Cardozo left Columbia Law School before taking 
his degree, and entered the family's law firm, where over two decades he established an outstand-
ing reputation as a litigator. He was elected to the state trial bench in 1913 and, after only a 
month, was detailed to assist the Court of Appeals with its overburdened docket. He never 
returned to the trial bench, being elected to his own term on the state's highest court in 1917. 
Ten years later, he was elected Chief Judge. He served in that capacity until 1932 when Presi-
dent Hoover appointed him to the U.S. Supreme Court. His years on the Court were neither 
particularly happy nor healthy, and he died in 1938. Id. 
2. Pp. 9-12. For example, Posner recounts that Warren Seavey used to admonish his torts 
students to avoid using metaphors and aphorisms that pass for legal analysis. Building upon 
Cardozo's famous "danger invites rescue" from Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437, 437 
(N.Y. 1921), Seavey would say "anyone who states on the exam 'danger invites rescue' invites an 
F." 
3. P. 10. Posner fails to mention some of the other highly unflattering descriptions in 
Frank's anonymous piece, published several years after Cardozo's death: his opinions were "ob-
scurely worded pronouncement[s]" which "ape[d] the English" and represented a "living mu-
seum of departed English usages." Anon Y. Mous, The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 
29 VA. L. REV. 62S, 639, 636 (1943). 
4. P. 12. Gilmore wrote: "[his opinions were so] elliptical, convoluted, at times incompre-
hensible .•• that the less gifted lower court New York judges were frequently at a loss to under-
stand what they were being told." GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 7S (1977). 
S. P. lS. G. Edward White is the most pointed example of this view, characterizing Cardozo 
as a hyperambitious hypocrite. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRAD!• 
TION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 2S4-60 (1988). White's allegations are based 
upon a thin historical record. Compare White's conclusions to those found in Paul Bricker, 
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo: A Fresh Look at a Great Judge, 11 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 23 n.112 
(1984), and Ira H. Carmen, The President, Politics and the Power of Appointment: Hoover's Nom-
ination of Mr. Justice Cardozo, SS VA. L. REV. 616, 619-20 (1969). 
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the generality, variety, and ambiguity of the reputee's work.6 Luck 
also plays a role - the knack for having one's vision meld with 
worldly events. Posner argues that an "attractive persona" and lon-
gevity tend to promote posthumous reputation (p. 65). Finally, repu-
tation, once established, tends to feed on itself. 7 
Having to his satisfaction defined, or at least described, reputation, 
Posner determines that there must be some way to measure it. Posner 
sets out to measure Cardozo's influence by counting citations. In 
Chapter Five, Posner traces the names of selected scholars and judges 
through law reviews. This data reveals that citation frequency is posi-
tively correlated with service on the U.S. Supreme Court, with re-
cency, and with an atheoretical bent (pp. 74-80). It also shows that 
while Cardozo is the most cited state court judge, he is not as fre-
quently cited in law reviews as many more contemporary, but gener-
ally less well-regarded Supreme Court Justices (Burger, Blackmun)8 or 
scholars, both practical {Tribe, Prosser) and theoretical (Dworkin, 
Michelman). Yet, when Cardozo's vintage - as well as his relatively 
brief tenure on the Supreme Court - is taken into account, Posner 
concludes that these numbers support the view that Cardozo has a 
good reputation. 
Posner's count of how often Cardozo's judicial opinions are cited 
in other judicial opinions is also revealing. Cardozo's New York 
Court of Appeals opinions are cited by the courts of New York and 
other jurisdictions far more frequently than those written by his col-
leagues (pp. 80-86). Similarly, Posner's analysis of Cardozo's Supreme 
Court years shows that over time his opinions have come to be cited 
more often than those of his respected colleagues, Louis Brandeis and 
Harlan Stone (pp. 86-90). 
Finally, Posner attempts to divine Cardozo's reputation among 
casebook editors. He surveys casebooks in torts, contracts, and sev-
eral other common law areas and concludes that Cardozo opinions 
appear far more frequently than those of his state court colleagues (pp. 
90-91). From all of this, Posner concludes that the empirical data 
tends to "confirm the high repute in which, by casual impression, Car-
dozo is held" (p. 91 ). 
Posner devotes the remainder of the book to exploring just why 
Cardozo is held in such high regard. Of the qualities Posner offers up, 
three stand out: Cardozo's antiformalist pragmatism, an attractive 
6. Pp. 60-62. Posner notes that diversification improves reputation only after the reputee has 
already established a baseline of good reputation; too much diffusion of point of view early in a 
career makes it initially harder to achieve fame. 
7. P. 68. This occurs in part because a reputer can effectively and efficiently bolster her 
position by calling upon the name of the reputee in an effort to cast reflected glory upon her 
position. · 
8. Because of the length of his tenure on the New York Court of Appeals, Cardozo is gener-
ally thought of as a state court judge. 
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persona (including a concern with morals), and, perhaps most signifi-
cantly, rhetorical eloquence. 
Cardozo's pragmatism was systematically articulated in The Na-
ture of the Judicial Process. 9 Posner considers this to be the "classic, 
full-blown exposition" of the "pragmatic" theory of adjudication (p. 
21). Posner credits the book for being the seminal self-conscious por-
trait of the judge at work, written from "a distinctively or identifiably 
judge's point of view" (p. 32). In its rejection of formalism - the 
strict adherence to a settled set of abstract principles unrelated to ac-
tual human experience - the candor reflected in The Nature of the 
Judicial Process led to the important and more radical critique of the 
realists (p. 21 ). 
Posner also surveys Cardozo's judicial opinions, with an eye to-
ward whether Cardozo was able to carry out his pragmatic jurispru-
dential agenda on the bench. Often, Posner concludes, Cardozo could 
not. Posner considers Hymes v. New York Central Railroad 10 to be a 
paradigmatic Cardozo opinion, evidencing not only great judicial craft 
(or, as Posner terms it, "rhetoric"), but also Cardozo's antiformalist 
pragmatism. Cardozo refused to apply the strictures of the common 
law rules involving trespassers to a claim brought by a "lad of sixteen" 
who was injured by falling electrical wires while preparing to dive into 
a public river from a plank protruding from a railroad's property. 
Cardozo emphasized that "the rights of bathers do not depend upon 
... nice distinctions [representative of] a jurisprudence of concep-
tions."11 Posner salutes Cardozo's effective personification of the 
plaintiff and description of his denouement, as well as the skillful use 
of geological and spatial metaphors - references to quicksand, planes, 
concentric spheres, and the like - in an opinion that "sweeps to its 
climax" (pp. 52, 55). Unfortunately, while embracing a realist's view 
of the situation and calling up "considerations of analogy, of conven-
ience, of policy, and of justice,"12 Cardozo never tells us exactly how 
these ends are served by allowing the trespassing youth to recover. 
Posner concludes, "[I]t is Cardozo the rhetorician, rather than Car-
dozo the pragmatic policy analyst ... whose hand is visible" (p. 53). 
Throughout the book Posner extols the virtues of Cardozo's rhe-
torical style, emphasizing the careful word selection, distinctive sen-
tence structure, and facility at reworking the arguments of others. 13 
In particular, Posner commends Cardozo's ability to coin successful 
9. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TIIE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
10. 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921). 
11. 131 N.E. at 899-900. 
12. 131 N.E. at 900. 
13. Pp. x, 95, 98, 126-27. Cardozo's opinions reflect "a master's touch as unmistakably as 
Shakespeare's paraphrases of Sir Thomas North's translations of Plutarch." P. 112. Posner de-
scribes Cardozo's ability to provide "value added" to the opinions of lower court judges and to 
the briefs of counsel as turning "dross into gold." P. 111. 
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epigrams. When Cardozo wrote "[t]he criminal is to go free because 
the constable blundered,"14 Cardozo was able to "pack[] into a simple 
sentence of eleven words the entire case against the exclusionary 
rule." 15 
Posner also identifies Cardozo's concern with morals, not only in 
his opinions in equity (where such concerns are to be expected), but 
also those in law, in which Cardozo endeavored to make the common 
law more closely reflect the prevalent morality in the affected nonlegal 
community. 16 However, Posner also details how Cardozo often failed 
to follow through on his pragmatist manifesto, especially in the scope 
of liability opinions, 17 that Posner says "do not hang together," "lack 
thrust," and are "inconsisten[t]" (pp. 113, 107, 113). Yet Posner 
views this inconsistency as ultimately contributing to Cardozo's repu-
tation because it provides some grist for everybody's mill: these 
opinions "demonstrate[ ] the importance of generality, of omnisignifi-
cance" (p. 113). 
Chapter Seven is Posner's wrap-up of the question of Cardozo's 
reputation. According to Posner, Cardozo's primary contribution was 
"pedagogical" in that he made the law "clearer, more interesting, 
more intelligible," and, at least modestly, more pragmatic (p. 126). 
When he made an innovation, it occurred without calling attention to 
that fact, a mark both of a reformer (but not a radical) and of a skilled 
rhetorician (pp. 127-28). Posner lists the following additional factors 
as contributing to Cardozo's "solidly professional reputation": ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court, the opportunity to serve on the most 
influential state court of his time, the extrajudicial writings, his attrac-
tive personal qualities, and his close relationship with academics (pp. 
128-32). But when all is said and done, it is with Cardozo's rhetorical 
skills that Posner is most taken, and to which Posner primarily attrib-
utes Cardozo's reputation (p. 132-33). 
II. THE REFLECTIONS 
The task Posner chose here was not a daunting one. Posner sets 
14. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
15. Pp. 56. Elsewhere Posner reminds us of other Cardozo gems: "danger invites rescue,'' 
Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921); "liability in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class,'' Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 
N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931); "[t]he soundness ofa conclusion may not infrequently be tested by its 
consequences," Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (N.Y. 1931). 
16. Posner cites Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (requirements contract has 
implied term requiring "best efforts"), as a case in which Cardozo tried to make the law follow 
the understanding of business people (pp. 92-97), and Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437 
(N.Y. 1921) (railroad owes duty to person trying to rescue injured passenger), as an example of 
Cardozo's effort to have the common law reflect the prevalent morality. Pp. 101-02. 
17. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); Glanzer v. Shephard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922); MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
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out to prove that Benjamin Cardozo has a good reputation, surely as 
uncontroversial an assertion as one can make these days. But the pro-
cess of looking closely at Cardozo must have suggested to Posner par-
allels between his own career and that of his subject. In fact, many of 
the aspects of Cardozo's life and work that Posner finds significant 
serve to cast reflections of Posner the scholar, judge, and man. 
A. Posner the Jurisprudent on Cardozo the Jurisprudent 
Posner introduces the book by observing that "Cardozo was also a 
distinguished contributor to jurisprudence - the philosophy of law -
advocating a form of legal pragmatism that resembles the pragmatism 
advocated in my book on jurisprudence."18 Cardozo's extrajudicial 
writings are noteworthy because they represent "the first systematic 
effort by a judge to explain how judges reason," written with an "artic-
ulate self-consciousness about the judicial function" (p. 32). Cardozo 
acknowledged that judges must legislate because faithful consideration 
of precedent, history, or custom does not always provide the answer to 
difficult questions in individual cases. In such circumstances, Cardozo 
would apply the "method of sociology." By this Cardozo meant that 
he would attempt to identify and then implement the outcome that 
best suited the general social welfare, in light of considerations of jus-
tice and the mores of the community.19 While by no means clear 
about exactly how to divine this information or how to weigh it, or 
always successful in following through by applying it,2° Cardozo's ju-
dicial philosophy was candid and reflective, and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, it rejected the rigid formalist notions of law that had continued 
to influence, if not predominate, into the third decade of this century. 
Perhaps because of the perceived press of time21 or an unwilling-
ness to explore the profound implications of a system that gives judges 
the power to decide what is in the social welfare, Posner's discussion 
of Cardozo's jurisprudence is superficial. Cardozo tasked the judge 
with determining what is "moral." The judge must identify and fol-
18. P. vii. Posner then cites not just his book The Problems of Jurisprudence (1990) [herein· 
after POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE], but also his earlier Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Rela· 
tion (1988) [hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE], which is less obviously a work of 
pragmatic jurisprudence. 
19. See CARDOZO, supra note 9, at 66, 71-72, 106. 
20. BERYL HAROLD LEVY, CARDOZO AND FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THINKING (rev. ed. 
1969); Ernest Nagel, Reflections on ''The Nature of the Judicial Process," 1 CARDOZO L. REv. 55 
(1979); Edwin W. Patterson, Cardozo's PhilosophyofLaw(pts. 1&2),88 U. PA. L. REV. 71, 156 
(1939). 
21. Posner averages a book and several articles a year while serving as a federal judge. This 
must make it difficult for him to give full attention to the mundane aspects of organization and 
editing. A number of his arguments in Cardozo are made in scatter-shot fashion. For example, 
in the midst of discussing the possible theoretical justifications for Cardozo's opinion in Ul· 
tramares, Posner digresses to point out how Cardozo's writing improves on the work of other 
lawyers, before returning to the subject at hand. Pp. 111-12. 
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low "the principle and practice of the men and women of the commu-
nity whom the social mind would rank as intelligent and virtuous,"22 
and this enterprise is most critical in times of rapid social change.23 
This analysis surely describes a process that is pregnant with political 
ramifications. A judge is elected by the majority (or appointed by gov-
ernment officials elected by majorities). To ask that cases be decided 
by reference to what is moral in light of the acquired wisdom of the 
community is surely to risk replicating the power arrangements with 
which the judge is familiar and comfortable (given the successful ac-
quisition of high office).24 Other problems abound. Do these determi-
native values spring only from the majority of the community? Must 
they reflect actual practices or merely aspirations?25 In hard cases, 
how is the community consensus identified? Posner ignores these diffi-
culties. Finally, the tension created by Cardozo's concern with utility 
(or "social welfare") on the one hand and notions of moral duty on the 
other is also glossed over.26 Posner is content to characterize Cardozo 
as a pragmatist and antiformalist, as if flexibility and relative candor 
are satisfactory descriptions of, let alone standards for, the exercise of 
judicial power. 27 
Posner's admiration for Cardozo's pragmatism might at first blush 
seem puzzling to a reader only casually familiar with the Posner ca-
non. For more than a decade, roughly 1972 to 1987,28 Richard Posner 
22. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 37 (1928). 
23. CARDOZO, supra note 9, at 136-38. 
24. See Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 486 (1982) 
("Although evidently struck by the power common-law judges exercise in [difficult cases], Car-
dozo was not moved to question the legitimacy of that power."); see also Jay M. Feinman, Practi-
cal Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 87 MICH. L. REv. 724, 727-31 (1988); Nancy Levit, 
Practically Unreasonable: A Critique of Practical Reason, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 494, 510-14 (1991) 
(reviewing POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18); Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 16 
CAL. L. REv. 465, 508-13 (1988) (book review). 
25. Nagel, supra note 20, at 59-60. 
26. See John C.P. Goldberg, Community and the Common Law Judge: Reconstructing Cor-
dozo's Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1324, 1326, 1335-36 (1990) (discussing the ap-
parent contradiction between Cardozo's "puritanical" sense of moral absolutes and his pragmatic 
concerns); see, e.g., Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (stating that 
building contractors who depart from contract specifications in bad faith cannot rely upon the 
doctrine of substantial performance: "The willful transgressor must accept the penalty of his 
transgression."). 
27. At one point, Posner does offer a modest critique of the limitations of Cardozo's pragma-
tism. Pp. 116-17. Posner states that Cardozo would have displayed a better judicial philosophy 
had he been able to take advantage of the tools of "modem economic analysis." This would have 
provided "an incisive framework for, or technique of, policy analysis." P. 117. Posner claims 
that "intimations" of an economic approach to law can be found in Cardozo's opinion in Adams 
v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919) (there is no negligence, and thus no liability, when the 
relationship between the seriousness and likelihood of danger is outweighed by the difficulty of 
avoiding the risk ab initio ). Of course, Cardozo stated this more eloquently: "Chance of harm, 
though remote, may betoken negligence, if needless. Facility of protection may impose a duty to 
protect." 125 N.E. at 94. 
28. Between the endpoints I employ - namely the first edition of RICHARD A. POSNER, 
EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972) and WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
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offered an express, detailed, and all-encompassing view of the law: 
wealth maximization is and should be the goal of the law and a con-
cern for the efficient distribution of assets was implicit in the common 
law.29 Posner the positivist, the formalist, described the world as it 
was (or could be) if only judges used the right analytical tools, to wit, 
the tools of the economist. 30 The sophistication and sheer volume of 
his work, plus his hubris, made him the best known and most contro-
versial proponent of law and economics.31 And law and economics 
certainly has had its day, figuring prominently in debates inside the 
academy, both in th~ pages of law reviews and in the discussions of 
curriculum and tenure review committees. 32 
In recent years, however, Posner has announced that he is a prag-
matist, an antiformalist. In The Problems of Jurisprudence, 33 Posner 
disclaimed fealty to grand theory. He rejected law as a branch of ex-
act inquiry based upon principles static over time and unrelated to the 
realities of social life. 34 He rejected legal "metaphysics," "artificial 
reason," "formalism," and "overarching conceptions" such as "cor-
rective justice," "natural law," and ''wealth maximization. " 35 He ac-
knowledged that wealth maximization cannot provide a complete 
EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) (the full·blown summary of much of what crune 
before) - Posner expressed his law and economics faith with the zeal of the true believer. 
29. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JusncE 6().103 (1981). 
30. See John E. Noyes, Book Review, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 410, 411 (1984); Warren Samuels 
& Nicholas Mercuro, Posnerian Law and Economics on the Bench, 4 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 
107-08 (1984). Of course, these labels can be slippery. As Posner observes: 
For that matter, a natural lawyer can be a positivist - Coke, and maybe Dworkin in his 
recent writings, which emphasize interpretation, fit this bill. And maybe a formalist can be 
a realist. Economic analysis of law is a formalist edifice erected on a realist base, so one is 
not surprised to find that it has been criticized as formalist by antiformalists and as realist by 
antirealists. And to the extent that the economic analyst seeks to shape law to conform to 
economic norms, economic analysis of law has a natural law flavor. 
POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 24. 
31. One of the great curiosities in all this is that Posner, an English major in college, had no 
formal training in economics. Perhaps his term at the Federal Trade Commission opened his 
eyes to the magic of markets. See David Ranii, The Next Nominee?, NATL. L.J., Nov. 26, 1984, 
at I, 26. 
32. Posner has proclaimed law and economics as the dominant theoretical school of legal 
analysis. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962·1987, 100 
HARV. L. REv. 761, 767-68 (1987). Despite the huge volume of response that his law and eco-
nomics writing has generated over the years, perhaps the most insightful critique was one of the 
first. See Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA, 
L. REv. 451 (1974). Leif described the first edition of Posner's Economic Analysis of Law as 
"four hundred pages of tunnel vision." Id. at 452. See also Izhak Englard, The System Builders: 
A Critical Appraisal of Modem American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 51-56 (1980) (indi· 
vidualistic conceptions underlying economic efficiency are inapposite in our modem collective 
society); Mario J. Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in 
Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980) (information costs and market imperfections frustrate eco-
nomic efficiency). 
33. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18. 
34. Id. at 15-16, 26. 
35. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 26, 28 (emphasis added); cf. Richard A. 
Posner, Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline?, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 
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theory of distributive justice because it lacks a moral theory to explain 
the initial distribution of assets and further that market efficiencies 
cannot always be allowed to override moral or egalitarian principles. 36 
He told us that the philosophy of science provides judges with two 
approaches, "logical deduction" and "empirical observation," neither 
of which adequately explains the process actually used by judges to 
decide hard cases. Rather, judicial reasoning is primarily a branch of 
"practical reason," characterized by "anecdote, introspection, imagi-
nation, common sense, empathy, imputation of motives, speaker's au-
thority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, memory, 'experience,' 
intuition, and induction."37 Posner cited Cardozo as reflective of (if 
not the source of) this pragmatism. 38 
This melange of decisional tools is surely much more like the flexi-
ble, community-based, self-consciously imperfect jurisprudence Car-
dozo articulated. But from the pen of the great system-builder, 
Richard Posner? What are we to make of this apparently fundamental 
change? Although psychobiography is a perilous exercise, the appar-
ently dramatic change in Posner's jurisprudence over a period of only 
a few years justifies consideration of whether the shift is real or only 
skin-deep, and why it occurred. 
First, one can question how much of a change of mind (or of heart) 
Posner's recent work really represents. The Problems of Jurisprudence 
did not entirely abandon the view that economic analysis can make for 
better judicial decisions. Rather, it may represent only a reformulated 
claim, that because his law and economics is not "metaphysical" and 
not based upon only a "supelficial examination of [the relation of im-
mutable principles] to fact," Posner is not a formalist.39 
333, 340 (1988) (stating that economic analysis can rescue the law from the "horrors of 
indeterminacy"). 
36. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 375-80; see also Bill Grady et al., Judicial 
Mating of Sex, Economics. CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1991, § 3, at 3 (Posner observes that economic 
analysis "can't tell you whose economic welfare is to be maximized"); Theodore R. Roth, Law 
and Economics, U. CHI. MAG., Aug. 1991, at 28, 31 (Posner admits that "[e]conomists •.. tend 
to accept the unequal distribution of income as a given, rather than examine it critically."). 
37. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 73. 
38. Id. at 28-29 (citing CARDOZO, supra note 9, at 66, 113 ("The final cause of law is the 
welfare of society"; "[the judge] must get his knowledge .•. from experience and study and 
reflection; in brief, from life itself."}). Similarly, Posner's more recent judicial opinions are char-
acterized by a refreshing pragmatism. An excellent example of this is Market Street Assocs. v. 
Frey, 941F.2d588 (7th Cir. 1991), in which Posner glowingly endorses the contract doctrine of 
"good faith" performance, an approach more likely to reach fair rather than efficient outcomes. 
Contrast this with his colleague Frank Easterbrook's hyperformalist approach to the same issue 
in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990). 
39. Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1653, 1663 
(1990) (emphasis added}; see also Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 
409, 425-28 (1990). Posner's position of course presumes that the central icons of economic 
analysis, like wealth maximization, preferences, efficiency, and so on, are themselves not reflec-
tive of immutable principles. See Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurispru-
dence, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1447 (1990); Levit, supra note 24, at 499. 
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Maybe it is but a short (but still significant) step from a strict ad-
herence to law and economics to a law and behavioral science perspec-
tive, or even more generally, to a broadly interdisciplinary approach to 
the law. Posner urges that we jettison our concern for "semantic" and 
"metaphysical" goals (like the promotion of human dignity and the 
securing of justice) and instead concentrate on issues "factual and em-
pirical."40 Toward this end "[i]nterdisciplinary legal theory is ines-
capable," and by being more receptive to the sciences we stand the 
best chance of understanding "the social behavior we call law."41 
Thus, Posner's law and economics now may be only one aspect of a 
larger scientistic view of law. 
Posner's pragmatism could also reflect a new modesty for his 
claims to the centrality of economic principles to legal analysis. For 
example, his 1988 book Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Rela-
tion 42 may be considered an acknowledgment of the vitality of a decid-
edly nonscientific, reader-centered jurisprudence. This explanation is 
unlikely to explain matters, however, because although Posner 
honored "law and literature" by the attention he gave it, his approach 
to the topic was essentially nonliterary, his motives political (to 
marginalize it), and his conclusions about its limited utility highly 
debatable. 43 
One may further hypothesize that Posner's pragmatism is part of a 
more general shift toward professional humility, that is, that Posner is 
now less willing to make grand claims for the importance of his work 
or for law and economics generally.44 Remember, this is a writer who 
has regularly articulated a "strong" vision of law and economics, and 
any concession to the inherent weaknesses of his theory will doubtless 
be pounced on with glee by the legions of Posner-bashers, and, more 
generally, critics of law and economics.45 Thus, even a modest mid-
course correction could be viewed as the product of mature attitude, of 
healthy reflection and self-criticism.46 
40. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 387, 123. Elsewhere he hopes for "a method 
of social engineering ••. susceptible of objective evaluation, much like the projects of civil engi-
neers." Id. at 122. 
41. Id. at 439, 374; cf Benjamin N. Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do For Law, in LAW AND 
LITERATURE AND OTHER EssAYS 371 (1931). 
42. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 18. 
43. See John D. Ayer, Aliens Are Coming/ Drain the Pool. 88 MICH. L. REV. 1584 (1990) 
(book review); James B. White, What Can a Lawyer Learn From Literature?. 102 HARV. L. REV. 
2014 (1989) (book review). 
44. Some evidence of this may be found in his writings beginning in the mid-19805. See, e.g., 
Smith, supra note 39, at 426 & n.84 (noting Posner's cautionary language in his 1983 work The 
Economics of Justice). 
45. See Eric Rakowski, Posner's Pragmatism, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1681, 1703-04 (1991) 
(book review). 
46. Posner considers "mature" attitudes to be the only ones worth taking seriously. See 
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 18, at 137-71 (describing his analysis as "mature," 
in contrast to other scholars' "romanticism"). 
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Perhaps the most likely explanation is that Posner is more prag-
matic because Posner is now an experienced judge. Cardozo's prag-
matism was rooted in his twenty years of practice as an appellate 
litigator and later in the enterprise of deciding real controversies in-
volving real people whose lives were directly affected by the outcomes 
he selected (and, to an extent, by the rhetoric he chose to explain those 
outcomes).47 While the academic is free (indeed, encouraged) to build 
systems characterized by blazing originality and boldness of social vi-
sion (although few do), the judge is far more constrained.48 The need 
to tell the parties what the law is and what sources of authority sup-
port this conclusion mark the judge's work. Similarly, the nature of 
the appellate court emphasizes collegiality and group decisionmaking, 
discourages intellectual autonomy, and tempers cold logic with untidy 
instincts such as fairness, compromise, and morality.49 Indeed, it was 
just this sense of the peculiar nature of the judge's job that made Car-
dozo's extrajudicial writings so valuable. Thus, Posner's pragmatism 
is a completely understandable byproduct of the dynamics of his job. 50 
Pragmatism also would be attractive to Posner for less flattering 
reasons. Read broadly, pragmatism is a jurisprudence that largely 
frees judges from the shackles that traditionally limit judicial power -
history, precedent, custom, natural law - replacing them with a 
deeply personal process of introspection that hopes to identify the all-
around best outcome in a given case.51 By insisting that the pragmatic 
judge is always reasonable and concerned with how the resolution of 
hard cases actually affects the real world, criticisms of judicial illegiti-
macy may be deflected. 52 A pragmatic Judge Posner may thus be 
more free to decide cases according to his personal agenda by assuring 
observers that he is being reasonable, and that everything relevant is 
considered before anything important is decided. 53 
47. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, Jurisprudence, Address to the New York State Bar Associa-
tion Meeting (Jan. 22, 1932), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENIAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 7, 28-
29 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947). 
48. Harry W. Jones, Multitude of Counselors: Appellate Adjudication as Group Decision-
Making. 54 TuL. L. REv. 541, 553-54 (1980). 
49. Benjamin Kaplan, Encounters With O. W. Holmes, Jr., 96 HARV. L. REV. 1828, 1849 
(1983); Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the 
Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REv. 887, 901, 904-07 (1987); see 
also IRWIN EDMAN, PHILOSOPHER'S HOLIDAY 33 (1938) ("[P]rofessors of philosophy study phi-
losophy; a philosopher studies life."). Posner appears to have recognized these phenomena in 
The Problems of Jurisprudence. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 156-57, 465 (dis-
cussing practical limits that are imposed on judges). 
50. See Richard A. Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant?, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 
23. 
51. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 30 (noting that judges necessarily apply 
their own "policy, politics, social vision, 'values,' even 'prejudice' " to answer difficult legal ques-
tions and that "[p]erhaps the highest aspiration of the judge is reasonableness in adjudication"). 
52. As Grant Gilmore observed, Cardozo's admission that judges made law was "widely 
regarded as a legal version of hardcore pornography." GILMORE, supra note 4, at 77. 
53. In particular, Posner is disdainful of the limiting hand of history. While discussing the 
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Posner's embrace of pragmatism is also likely a reaction to the ex-
periences of his fellow judge, Robert Bork. Bork, like Posner, is a 
prolific and controversial scholar, especially as a result of his vigorous 
articulation of an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation. s4 
As Bork moved to the more public arena of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
and to the brink of the Supreme Court in 1987, however, he discarded 
a number of the most extreme positions that he had taken while in the 
academy (for example, that Brown v. Board of Education was wrongly 
decided). In his review of Bork's Tempting of America, Posner in-
sightfully commented upon why Bork changed his views: "As a pub-
lic man, and one who quite properly tried to conciliate critics and 
reassure doubters at his confirmation hearing, Bork may have disabled 
himself from pressing [his] originalism to its logical extreme ... . "ss 
With his own sights possibly set on the Supreme Court,s6 and in-
formed by how Bork's jurisprudence failed in the confirmation process 
(the market of public opinion), Posner no doubt perceived the political 
virtues of the moderate-sounding jurisprudence of pragmatism. For 
an ambitious judge, reasonableness is more likely to play in Peoria 
than economic analysis, Cardozo more palatable than Pareto. s7 
Additional clues as to why Posner is changing lurk in his examina-
tion of Cardozo's reputation. Posner argues that "[p]osthumous repu-
tation is facilitated by the generality, variety, and ambiguity of the 
reputee's work, or in short by its adaptability to social, political, and 
cultural change" (pp. 60-61). Posner holds up Holmes as an example 
difficulty of interpreting constitutional texts, Posner commented that "[t]here are other reasons 
for obeying a judicial decision besides the Court's ability to display, like the owner of a champion 
airedale, an impeccable pedigree for the decision, connecting it to its remote eighteenth-century 
ancestor." Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1990). Pos-
ner's writings on statutory interpretation also reflect a disdain for limits on judicial activism. See 
Rakowski, supra note 45, at 1697-702. 
54. See, e.g. ROBERT H. BORll:, THE TEMFTING OF AMERICA: THE PoLmCAL SEDUCTION 
OF LAW 144 (1990) (stating that a judge interpreting the Constitution should only consider "how 
the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time [of enactment]"). 
More broadly, Bork's narrow view of the constitutional protection of individual liberties and his 
willingness to think in terms of maximizing society's wealth helped his opponents successfully 
characterize him as "cold and uncaring." Roth, supra note 36, at 36. 
SS. Posner, supra note 53, at 1379. 
56. See generally Ranii, supra note 31, at 26; see also pp. 128-29 (appointment to Supreme 
Court enhanced Cardozo's reputation). 
57. A similar lesson can be drawn from the brief foray of Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg into 
the Supreme Court nomination process. Although he eventually withdrew as a nominee because 
of certain personal peccadillos, the nominee was initially the target of criticism because of his 
economic analysis of legal issues. In particular, Ginsburg, while serving as an official in the 
Office of Management and Budget, had torpedoed Environmental Protection Agency regulations 
intended to curtail the use of asbestos. Ginsburg concluded that the cost of the rule outweighed 
the benefits, based in part on his decision that a lost human life was worth $22,000. A congres· 
sional report characterized the methodology as "morally repugnant." Ginsburg's other law and 
economics writings were also widely criticized in conjunction with his short-lived nomination to 
the Court. See Robert Pear, Court Choice in Focus: A Portrait of Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
1987, at 1. 
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of a jurist whose reputation was enhanced by "the enigmatic, in a 
sense unfinished character of [his] work. . . . His vast and none too 
consistent output . . . provided aphorisms for every position in juris-
prudence debates and has made the search for the 'true' Holmes a 
fascinating, if ultimately insoluble jigsaw puzzle" (p. 61). No one 
would characterize Richard Posner circa 1987 that way; indeed, many 
would dismiss him as the composer of one creative theme embroidered 
with a hundred variations. 58 But if Posner is to succeed in what he 
terms "the historical fame derby" (p. 61), he needs to be less predict-
able, less reducible to "Oh, I know where he comes out on this issue." 
So, by introducing a little elusiveness and ambiguity he can garner 
attention and interest on the part of reputers. 
It is important to remember that Posner is still concerned with 
markets, and in the Cardozo book expressly with how one prevails in 
the market of reputations. Despite turning out scholarship at a 
breakneck pace, Posner must have sensed that he had painted himself 
into an intellectual comer, with adverse consequences for his reputa-
tion. While the decade 1975-1985 saw the emergence of law and eco-
nomics as perhaps the most provocative voice in the academy, the sun 
has since begun to set on the Chicago school. One reason is the fad-
dishness of intellectual thought (although evolution would be the more 
flattering term), which by the late 1980s made the central observations 
of law and economics seem less threatening and (this is the true indict-
ment) largely old hat.59 The dominant theme in the new legal scholar-
ship became a self-consciously personal and nonscientific perspective, 
whether feminist,60 literary,61 or communitarian,62 to name a few of 
the contenders. In addition, "pragmatism" is now the rallying cry for 
a broad range of essentially flexible, but ultimately conservative schol-
58. As a rock critic once asked rhetorically when discussing the Moody Blues' album Seventh 
Sojourn, "[h]ave they made seven albums one time or one album seven times?" 
59. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A 
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23 (1989). Posner basically 
acknowledged this development in his reply to Professor Ellickson. See Richard A. Posner, The 
Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson, 65 CH1.-KENT L. REv. 57, 57 (1989); 
see also Roth, supra note 36, at 31 (reach oflaw and economics theory is "slowing"). In 1984, a 
more optimistic Posner commented that law and economics had rendered some law professors 
"obsolete." Ranii, supra note 31, at 26. 
60. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 10 (1986). 
61. Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and 
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384 (1985). 
62. Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987). The eclipse of 
law and economics is far less pronounced in pockets of the law characterized by market regula-
tion, see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control· The Institutional Investor as Corpo-
rate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1991), and in the public choice literature, if one 
considers it to be derivative of economic analysis. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 469 
(1987). 
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ars. 63 Posner needed to join the battle on their terms and at least ap-
pear to be sensitive to the new arguments being made. Law and 
Literature: A Misunderstood Relation and The Problems of Jurispru-
dence were most directly responsive to these concerns, 64 but so also is 
Cardozo: A Study in Reputation, in which Posner cleaves himself to 
the works of the consummate common law judge and skeptic about 
the utility of grand systems. Richard Posner surely is on the move, 
but to where we cannot be sure, and this may well improve Posner's 
ability to stay on the agenda with reputers, present and future. 
Similarly, Posner's methodology of cite-counting as a proxy for 
reputation may have been prompted by an interest in shoring up his 
reputation. A central thesis of Law and Literature was that great liter-
ature is that which stands the test of time as mea~ured by an enduring 
concern with reading and understanding the work. 65 This market-ori-
ented, Darwinist view of literature is replayed in the context of cita-
tions to legal authority in the Cardozo study. If frequency of citation 
is a proxy for Cardozo's good reputation then one surely would like to 
know how Richard Posner measures up. Posner modestly does not 
tell us, although a methodology similar to that which he used to evalu-
ate Cardozo places Posner in third place on the list of frequency of 
citation in law reviews. 66 Similarly, Posner appears very frequently in 
casebooks. 67 Both of these measures put the greatest weight on the 
view from the academy, because writers in scholarly journals and edi-
tors of casebooks constitute the vast bulk of authors and editors in 
these venues. But Posner is also frequently cited by other judges. 68 
Assuming that cite counting represents an accurate indicator of repu-
tation, 69 Posner is undoubtedly a leading figure in the law, especially 
considering that he is only in his early fifties. It is clear from Cardozo 
and the books that immediately preceded it that Posner has attempted 
to enhance his reputation by providing an increasingly broad, accessi-
63. See Feinman, supra note 24, at 728-30. 
64. This enterprise was at the heart of Law and Literature. The main chapters are Posner's 
responses to law and literature critiques of his work offered by Robin West and Richard Weis-
berg. See Ayer, supra note 43, at 1600-02. 
65. See POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 18, at 71-74. 
66. He comes in behind Justices Brennan and Rehnquist. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David 
M. O'Brien, Gauging Reputations, NATL. L.J., Apr. 1, 1991, at 13, 14. 
67. Although not nearly as often for his judicial opinions as for his extrajudicial writings. 
One exception is his opinion in Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum, 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 
1985), which appears in at least eight contracts casebooks. See Collins & O'Brien, supra note 66, 
at 14, n.7. 
68. See Sheldon M. Novick, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation, 21 TRIAL 84, 87 (Mar. 1991) 
(Book Review); Gordon Crovitz, Winds of Change on the Bench, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1985, at 
24. 
69. Posner acknowledges that the methodology is not foolproof. Pp. 70-71, 75. For exam-
ple, the citation count cannot distinguish between critical and flattering references, between a cite 
to a work as merely a global summary and one that is a specific discussion of a proposition, nor 
distinguish the word black from a reference to (Hugo) Black. 
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ble, and topical mix of themes and by identifying a methodology of 
measurement that, for the time being at least, conveniently reinforces 
his predominant stature in contemporary American jurisprudence. 
B. Posner the Rhetorician on Cardozo the Rhetorician 
Posner has written before on the question of Cardozo's rhetorical 
skills. He asserted in 1986 that Cardozo was not a master of judicial 
style,7° and in 1988 that Cardozo suffered from "an ornateness that at 
times lends an unserious quality to his prose and to his thought. "71 
He also more generally criticized judicial craft (a concern of Car-
dozo's) as adding nothing of real value to opinions. In essence, rheto-
ric was a bag of tricks that enabled a judge to make an opinion more 
persuasive than its merits warranted. 72 
In this book Posner is far more charitable, especially to Cardozo's 
judicial opinions. 73 Cardozo now writes with "striking freshness, clar-
ity, and vividness," with "[t]he power to compress a tradition of legal 
thought into a sentence" (pp. 45, 56). Posner salutes both Cardozo's 
"writing style" and the "architecture of his opinions," which together 
result in "cumulative and mass effect" (pp. 126, 55). A master rhetori-
cian like Cardozo makes it more likely that a judicial opinion will not 
be 
so chained to the immediate context of its creation. It can be pulled out 
and made exemplary of law's durable concerns. That is, it is literature; 
literature is the body of texts that survive the context in which they were 
created because they speak to us today. The literary judge wears best 
over time. [p. 143; footnote omitted] 
The way in which Posner discusses the moral language and con-
cerns that frequently crop up in Cardozo opinions represents more 
than a grudging appreciation of the work of the nonscientist judge. 
Posner points out that Cardozo would strive to reach moral outcomes 
and effectively to use the language of moral discourse to reach them. 
For example, in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 74 although ignoring the 
fact that a contract called for a specific brand of pipe and required that 
70. Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. R.Ev. 1351, 
1386 (1986). 
71. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 18, at 293. Support for this was found in 
Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), which led Posner to conclude 
that "Cardozo has Brutus' problem: his rhetoric draws attention to itself." POSNER, LA w AND 
LITERATURE, supra note 18, at 294. 
72. This was the conclusion in chapter 6 of Law and Literature. See Richard Weisberg, 
Entering with a Vengeance: Posner on Law and Literature, 41 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1597, 1606 n.34 
(1989) (book review); White, supra note 43, at 2037. 
73. Posner remains generally unimpressed by Cardozo's extrajudicial writing: "Extended -
indeed extravagant - metaphor, a tone arch and coy, and staccato sentences lending a dramatic 
air to the proceedings - these are hallmarks of the overdone style that is common in Cardozo's 
non-judicial prose ...• " P. 22. 
74. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
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all defective work would be corrected, Cardozo wrote that "[t]he will-
ful transgressor must accept the penalty of his transgression. For him 
there is no occasion to mitigate the rigor of implied conditions. The 
transgressor whose default is unintentional and trivial may hope for 
mercy if he will offer atonement for his wrong."75 Later, when defin-
ing the duties that arise out of a fiduciary relationship, Cardozo wrote 
that "[a] trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the 
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the 
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."76 The young Rich-
ard Posner surely would have found such moralizing unattractive, and 
Cardozo's distaste for the morals of the marketplace would have 
seemed to be naive if not wrong-headed. But today's Posner treats this 
aspect of Cardozo's writing with respect. 71 
What might explain Posner's changed evaluation? The most plau-
sible explanation is that Posner now has systematically read all of Car-
dozo's work, rather than isolated parts.78 However, the new Posner 
may in fact be more drawn to Cardozo's rhetorical craft for reasons 
not expressly discussed in the book. Posner has been harshly criti-
cized for his attempt to suppress the ethically complex language that 
so characterized the common law and to replace it with the more pre-
cise but morally empty language of the social scientist and econo-
mist~ 79 Perhaps the flap over his advocating "baby buying" 
(deregulation of the market in adoption) has alerted him to the impact 
that choice of language can have on perceptions of the legitimacy of an 
75. 129 N.E. at 891 (citations omitted). Posner also points out how the statement of facts in 
this case strikes a populist note, Cardozo implying that the breach of contract action was being 
pursued by a "rich man" attempting to harness the law to serve "mandarin" needs. Pp. 106·07. 
Cardozo's moral vision and its impact on his judicial decisions is further discussed in Stanley C. 
Brubaker, The Moral Element in Cardozo's Jurisprudence, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 229 (1979). 
76. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Note how the nontraditional sen· 
tence structure enhances the impact of the legal rule announced. 
77. Posner concludes that "[n]o judge seems ever to have come up with a better formula with 
which to express the concept of fiduciary duty." P. 105. Posner also gives attention to less 
morally charged aspects of Cardozo's rhetoric. Posner says it is acceptable for Cardozo to pres· 
ent facts selectively, and to an extent misleadingly. Pp. 43, 137. A breezy, dramatic flair for 
facts, an air of culture, and idiosyncratic though effective departures from English prose style are 
all identified as admirable traits (pp. 126-27) as is the skill at coining epigrams. P. 56. Finally, 
Posner salutes the tempered (and to some extent oblique) manner in which Cardozo presented 
his conclusions: Cardozo's reformist jurisprudence was cloaked so as to be "the quietest of revo· 
lutionary manifestos." P. 109. 
78. In Law and Literature Posner discussed but one opinion, and it was from Cardozo's 
tenure on the Supreme Court. The new book is concerned almost exclusively with the state court 
years, which were rhetorically more successful. See Michael L. Richmond, In Defense of Poesie, 
57 FORDHAM L. REv. 901, 926-27 (1989) (book review); Richard H. Weisberg, Law, Literature 
and Cardozo's Judicial Poetics, 1 CARDOZO L. REv. 283 (1979). 
79. See, e.g., Peter R. Teachout, Worlds Beyond Theory: Toward the Expression of an In· 
tegrative Ethic far Self and Culture, 83 MICH. L. REV. 849, 881-83 (1985) (book review) (arguing 
that a reductive use of the vocabulary of economics exerts disintegrative pressures upon the law 
and society). 
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underlying premise. 80 A newfound linguistic sensitivity is particularly 
likely because this debate seeped out of academic literature and into 
the broader political arena. 81 
Posner's own rhetoric in Cardozo is far more tame than that which 
used to characterize his extrajudicial writing. There are no slips into 
the ad hominem, 82 little parading of erudition for its own sake, 83 and 
relatively few suggestions of the distant scientist-observer prevalent in 
his law and economics tracts. 84 And when it comes to a glistening 
style, Posner provides some of his own. It is almost as if Posner was 
inspired to write like Cardozo by virtue of spending time immersed in 
Cardozo. Felicitous ~entences and epigrams abound. At one point, 
Posner discusses Cardozo's "elliptical and slanted" (p. 38) presenta-
80. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 323, 328, 326, 327, 339, 341 (1978) ("suppliers" (the natural parents); "demand-
ers" (prospective adoptive parents); "unsold inventory stored in a warehouse" (children in foster 
care); "prices for children of equivalent quality"; "the marginal costs of producing •.• babies of a 
given quality"; "market involving a complex and durable good"). Even Posner's cautionary ex-
pressions in this piece are shocking in their dehumanization. "Further, we are speaking only of 
sales of newborn infants, and do not suggest that parents should have a right to sell older chil-
dren." Id. at 344. "Moreover, it is incorrect to equate the possession of property rights with the 
abuse of property, even if the property is a human being." Id. "However, so long as the market 
for eugenically bred babies did not extend beyond infertile couples and those with serious genetic 
disorders, the impact of a free baby market on the genetic composition and distribution of the 
human race at large would be small." Id. at 345. See also Forum: Adoption and Market Theory, 
67 B.U. L. REV. 59-175 (1987), which devotes 117 pages to Posner's defense of "baby buying" 
and three responses thereto. The rhetoric of Posner's defense, here appearing in a mainstream 
legal journal, is far more conventional than that found in his original Swiftian (immodest) propo-
sal. This is most noticeable when he insists on referring to the proposal as "deregulation" of 
adoption rather than "baby selling." Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adop-
tion, 61 B.U. L. REV. 59, 70-71 (1987). For a spirited general attack on Posner's rhetoric, see 
Peter R. Teachout, Chicago Exposition: The New American Jurisprudential Writing As a Cul-
tural Literature, 39 MERCER L. REv. 767, 791-99 (1988). But see Donald N. McCloskey, The 
Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV. 752, 761-62 (1988), for a more charitable 
view of Posner's use of the economic vocabulary. 
81. See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, Is the Supreme Court Ready for this Kind of Free-Market Jus-
tice?, WASH. Posr, Sept. 30, 1984, at Dl. 
82. Indeed, Peter Teachout views Posner as a prime instigator of the "new scholarship,'' 
which, inter a1ia, is characterized by hyper-aggression and a tendency to elevate one's own ideas 
through active denigration of competing ideas in the academic marketplace. See Teachout, supra 
note 80, at 771-75. Others have noted Posner's rhetorical slipperiness. See Ernest J. Weinreb, 
Adjudication and Public Values: Fiss's Critique of Co"ective Justice, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 2 n.3 
(1989); White, supra note 43, at 2030. But while Cardozo overall reflects a change, there is still 
some zip in Posner's fastball; he takes a gratuitous swipe at unnamed "feminists" who criticized 
Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), for displaying a 
lack of empathy for Mrs. Palsgraf. See p. 47; see also Richard A. Posner, Duncan Kennedy on 
Affirmative Action, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1161. 
83. Compare POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 9, in which Posner, who taught 
himself Greek as an adult, provides his own translations of classical texts. · 
84. In Cardozo, Posner generally resists seeing all the world through the eyes of an econo-
mist, although there are exceptions. At one point he opines that "[c]ommercial morality is per-
haps the same thing as efficiency." P. 101. Note that even this proposition is stated in tentative 
language. Elsewhere, Posner calls trespassers on land "low-cost accident avoider[s]" (p. 50 n.26) 
and property owners "superior Joss avoiders" vis-a-vis water companies. P. 114. 
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tion of the facts in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. 85 and how it served to 
make the opinion more effective. Posner writes, "mention that [plain-
tiff's only injury] was a stammer would have made the accident seem 
not only freakish but silly, a put-on, a fraud. The scale fell on Mrs. 
Palsgraf and made her stammer. Tell us another. Great cases are not 
silly."86 The book has a loose, conversational feel that makes it easily 
the most readable Posner book yet, and Posner's fondness for his sub-
ject is apparent throughout. 87 
C. Posner the Judge on Cardozo the Judge 
The bulk of Cardozo is devoted to a discussion of a number of 
Cardozo's court of appeals decisions. As might be expected, Pals-
graf 88 is at center stage. Posner provides an abundance of detail about 
the actual facts of Palsgraf, which he contrasts with Cardozo's "ellipti-
cal and slanted" presentation (pp. 33-36, 38-39). Posner salutes Car-
~ ~~b~~~b~~~~~~~~ 
he left out, viewing this as the mark of a "self-consciously literary 
judge."89 Posner also points out that Cardozo's deviations from stan-
85. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
86. P. 42. Another example is the pun Posner includes in his discussion of Wood v. Duff-
Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917), in which Cardozo held that a contract implies that the 
recipient of exclusive sales rights must use best efforts; Posner observes that the recipient cannot 
''.just sit on his duff." P. 93. Later, Posner compliments Cardozo for not using the opinion to 
make "[a] frontal assault [on the doctrine of consideration that] almost certainly would have 
failed. Cardozo was not Quixote." P. 95. 
87. This change in tone is also reflected in Posner's judicial opinions. For example, in Loss-
man v. Pekarske, 707 F.2d 288, 290 (7th Cir. 1983), Posner wrote that children had little or no 
liberty interest in staying with their natural parents because when the state intervened, the chil-
dren were merely going from "one form of bondage to another." The parents had no liberty 
interest because "[p]eace of mind is not liberty." 707 F.2d at 292. Compare this to Wyletal v. 
United States, 907 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1990), where the majority summarily upheld a trial judge's 
award of $25,000 to an octogenarian seriously injured in a collision with a postal truck. Posner, 
dissenting, wrote: 
It is natural to want to give short shrift to a small case. The district judge succumbed to 
the temptation, embodying the findings of fact that Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure required him to make in an unedited oral opinion that neither demonstrates that 
he performed his proper function as the trier of fact nor provides an adequate predicate for 
our performance of the appellate function. 
[Furthermore], the $10,000 that the judge awarded for pain and suffering was shockingly 
small. An 85 year old woman broke her hip and as a result must use a walker to walk, and a 
bar in the bathroom to lift herself from the toilet seat, and she has suffered pain and the 
aggravation of a bladder condition. As the old saying goes old age is not for sissies •••• 
She deserves a better shot from the federal courts. I would reverse the judgment and 
remand to the district court for further findings. 
907 F.2d at 51-53 (Posner, J., dissenting); see also In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 607 (7th Cir. 
1990) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("I am at a loss to understand why we should strain the language 
and ignore the purpose of the lien-avoidance statute in order to achieve a result that does not 
promote, but instead denies, simple justice - layman's justice."). 
88. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
89. P. 43. For example, Cardozo placed Mrs. Palsgrafat the far end of the railroad platform 
"many feet away" from the explosion. The record does not support this characterization. P. 39. 
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dard prose made for an effective "brevity and vividness" (p. 44). Un-
fortunately, this lively discussion of rhetoric is accompanied by a 
rather dispirited analysis of the legal issues involved.90 Cardozo held 
that a negligent defendant is not liable to an unforeseeable plaintiff 
because it owes her no duty. Posner concludes: "So Cardozo engi-
neered a minority solution, not markedly superior to the unsatisfac-
tory majority [proximate cause] solution" (p. 41 ). 
Posner is on to something, however, when he recognizes that Car-
dozo's handling of the facts and the "eloquently pedagogic character" 
of Palsgraf contribute to its reputation (pp. 43-45). Sketchy facts do 
make it more likely that an opinion will come to stand for a general 
principle, and the fame of Judge Andrews' equally theoretical dissent 
is noted (pp. 45-46). But Posner fails to follow through on the impli-
cations of these observations.91 Indeed, perhaps more was afoot in 
1927 than Posner realizes. 
Shortly after the intermediate court affirmed the jury award to 
Mrs. Palsgraf, the American Law Institute met in Philadelphia to 
draft the Restatement of Torts.92 On the table was the question of a 
negligent defendant's duty to an unforeseeable plaintiff. Cardozo, a 
member of the ALI, was, along with the others, provided with a sum-
mary of the facts from the intermediate court opinion. Even though 
he knew it was quite likely that he would be called upon to actually 
decide the appeal, Cardozo listened to the lively discussion that en-
sued. One group argued for a duty analysis and no recovery; the 
others proximate cause. By a very narrow margin, the advocates of 
90. Posner observes that liability for less than the full consequences of the railroad's negli-
gence may result in under-deterrence. Seep. 37. Later, he criticizes Cardozo for failing to con-
sider the specific ramifications of the foreseeability analysis, and he runs through a stock series of 
hypotheticals to prove that Cardozo never came to grips with what really happened to Helen 
Palsgraf. See pp. 40-41. Dean Prosser traveled this same ground many years ago, and Posner's 
rendition offers no new insights. See William F. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mice. L. REv. 1, 
7, 19-32 (1953). 
91. Posner is correct when he points to Judge Andrews' dissent as contributing to the fame of 
Cardozo's majority opinion, but wrong as to why this is so. Posner says the dissent is "much 
praised [but] inept." P. 45. Posner primarily faults Andrews for failing to give specific content 
to the operative notion of proximate cause, thus ceding the "legal high ground" to Cardozo's 
universal test of "foreseeability." P. 46. But it is just this context-specific, malleable quality that 
has made Andrews' approach the majority rule (and thus the "best" rule, at least as measured by 
Darwinist notions of the marketplace). Andrews observed that proximate cause is, at base, a 
matter "of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, [in which] the law arbitrarily 
declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical 
politics." Pa/sgraf, 162 N.E. at 103. He explained that "[w]e draw an uncertain and wavering 
line, but draw it we must as best we can." 162 N.E. at 104. Not only is Andrews describing 
what in fact judges do when deciding difficult negligence cases, but he is sounding the clarion call 
of the pragmatist. On the other hand, Cardozo announced a universal rule, ostensibly built on a 
neutral principle, that fails to capture the complexity of the problem. Also, even on his own 
terms, Cardozo failed to do justice to Helen Palsgraf, who, as a patron of the railroad, was 
certainly a foreseeable plaintiff while standing on the platform in defendant's station. 
92. The following discussion of Cardozo, Pa/sgraf, and the ALI is drawn from Prosser, supra 
note 90, at 4-5. 
1758 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1739 
duty prevailed. When Cardozo returned to Albany, he was assigned 
the majority opinion. He adopted the duty analysis and denied recov-
ery to Mrs. Palsgraf. Andrews' dissent would have affirmed the jury 
award based on proximate cause. Shortly thereafter, the duty analysis 
became the ALi's official position and Cardozo's Palsgraf opinion was 
prominently raised in support of this conclusion.93 
In light of these facts, one might consider Palsgraf in a different 
light. Might Cardozo and Andrews have agreed, formally or other-
wise, to debate the general question of the nature of negligence law 
and the subsidiary question of the relationship between duty and prox-
imate cause (and thus, judges and juries) in the pages of the New York 
Reports? Perhaps this explains both the factual barrenness and the 
theoretical forays that characterized the opinions. This also might ex-
plain why Cardozo's opinion seems uncharacteristically insensitive to 
Helen Palsgraf and her injuries.94 Posner recognizes that Cardozo 
"set out to teach us some basic truths about the law of torts" (pp. 43-
44), but instead of inspecting the historical record and using it as a 
vehicle for a more creative reflection on the case, Posner concludes his 
analysis of Palsgraf by swerving back into one of his many paeans to 
Cardozo's rhetoric.9s 
Another example of Posner's stunted analysis of Cardozo's judicial 
opinions arises in his consideration of Palsgraf and the other scope of 
liability cases, MacPherson, 96 Wagner, 91 Glanzer, 98 Moch, 99 and Ul-
tramares. 100 Posner tells us that all six deal with essentially the same 
question: To whom does a negligent defendant owe a duty? Scattered 
throughout the book, each is given some attention. MacPherson (de-
cided in 1916) "inaugurated fundamental changes in American tort 
law" because it "change[d] profoundly the climate of opinion regard-
ing privity of contract."101 Wagner (1921) imposed a duty on a rail-
93. Id. at 8. As Dean Prosser observed, "[i]t is not likely that any other case in nll history 
ever elevated itself by its own bootstraps in so remarkable a manner." Id. 
94. See JOHN T. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MAsKS OF THE LAW 111-51 (1976). Posner dis-
cusses Noonan's critique of the Palsgraf opinion, but in another context. Pp. 16-17. 
95. P. 47. Posner's lack of interest in the history of Palsgrafis fully consistent with his other 
writings. See supra note 53. Posner also fails to note the connection between the "pedagogic" 
nature of the opinion and its uniform appearance in torts casebooks. Palsgraf is a favorite of 
torts teachers precisely because it is not tethered to the particular facts of Helen Palsgraf's claim. 
When Cardozo contrasts tort law to the law of crimes, cites leading British cases, and offers 
hypotheticals (and Andrews responds more or less in kind), the essential disputes of tort law are 
laid bare. This is the stuff of great Socratic dialogues and it explains why the case remains 
relevant today, far more so than Cardozo's writing style or the "rule" that purports to come out 
of the case. 
96. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
97. Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921). 
98. Glanzer v. Shephard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922). 
99. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928). 
100. IBtramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). 
101. Pp. 42, 109. Before MacPherson, the general rule was that the consumer of a product 
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road to use reasonable care to protect a person trying to rescue 
another who had been injured by the negligent operation of its trains. 
Posner cites this opinion as a key illustration of a Cardozo "master 
principle": "a person should be presumptively liable for the injuries 
he inflicts if the relevant lay community would think the injurer seri-
ously in the wrong" (p. 101). In Glanzer (1922), Cardozo held that 
weighers who were hired by sellers owed a duty to buyers who relied 
upon their (the weighers') representations. Posner describes this deci-
sion as exemplary of Cardozo's moral concern with extending liability 
beyond the formalities of the law of contracts and to deserving plain-
tiffs (pp. 100-01). In contrast, the remaining scope of liability case$, 
decided 1928-1931, all result in no liability for culpable defendants, 
even when the consequences of the negligence were foreseeable. 102 At 
the penultimate point in the book, Posner compares only four of these 
opinions (MacPherson, Glanzer, Moch, and Ultramares), and pro-
nounces the mixed bag of outcomes "puzzling."103 
Here again, Posner fails to garner valuable information from the 
historical record. There is a clear trend in the six cases. The early 
Cardozo opinions were willing to break with precedent and ignore the 
strictures of contract and other impediments to creating symmetry be-
tween negligence and liability. The later opinions reversed field. By 
considering together only four of the opinions and by failing to note 
the chronology, Posner missed a chance to think more critically about 
his subject. Why might Cardozo, after becoming Chief Judge in 1927, 
begin to write opinions denying liability? Cardozo could well have 
been responding to the larger economic forces at work: while expan-
sive tort liability was justified in the context of the vigorous capitalism 
practiced in pre-Depression New York, the advent of the Depression 
might well counsel a changed course. This is certainly possible, but it 
is not mentioned in the opinions (or in Posner's book). Posner comes 
tantalizingly close to what is likely the explanation when he observes 
that the inconsistency in these opinions actually added to Cardozo's 
reputation (p. 113). But he does not suggest that the change might 
have occurred because Cardozo hoped to impress others with his bal-
ance and flexibility. G. Edward White has tried to glean from the 
could not sue the nonprivy manufacturer for personal injury. The exception was if the product 
was "abnormally dangerous." Cardozo turned the exception into the rule by allowing essentially 
any product that causes injury to be considered "abnormally dangerous." See W. PAGE KEETON 
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 96, at 682-83 (5th ed. 1984). 
102. Moch, 159 N.E. at 896 (water works owes no duty to owner of house that burned down 
as a result of defendant's water mains lacking adequate pressure); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (negligent railroad owes no duty to patron injured by explosion while 
standing on its platform); Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 441 (negligent accounting firm owes no duty 
to a nonclient recipient of its audit report). 
103. P. 109. Posner does try to reconcile these decisions by considering whether they can be 
justiiied by identification of the "superior loss avoiders." Posner concludes that even on that 
basis Ultramares was wrongly decided. Pp. 113-15. 
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historical record evidence of Cardozo's crass ambition and longstand-
ing desire to be elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court. 104 After years of 
being the bridesmaid, Cardozo could well have been positioning him-
self for such an appointment, knowing that a Republican president 
was unlikely to elevate an unswerving reformer, no matter how well 
regarded by the bench and bar.1os 
This historical understanding of Cardozo may also shed light on 
Posner's performance as a judge. Richard Posner has now completed 
a decade on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Posner 
came to the bench with a long record of academic writing. His view 
was that economic concepts were relevant not just to legal problems 
like antitrust that are understandably susceptible to economic analysis, 
but also to nonmarket issues, including torts, family law, civil proce-
dure, and constitutional law.106 In his early years as a judge, he set to 
the task of incorporating economic analysis into a broad range of deci-
sional law.107 The best known of his efforts at this enterprise have 
been unsuccessful. 
For example, in Merritt v. Faulkner, 108 the question presented was 
whether a trial judge abused discretion by denying appointment of 
counsel to an indigent prisoner who had alleged that his blindness was 
the result of deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The panel 
reversed. Posner dissented, arguing, inter alia, that the inability of the 
prisoner to obtain counsel on his own proved that the claim was with-
out merit: "a prisoner who has a good damages suit should be able to 
hire a competent lawyer and ... by making the prisoner go this route 
we subject the probable merit of his case to the test of the market."109 
Thus, in lieu of analyzing the factors traditionally weighed by the Sev-
104. See WHITE, supra note 5, at 255-56. 
105. Cardozo's name had been floated for a Supreme Court appointment as early as 1916, 
and it came up again, and more seriously, in conjunction with several vacancies in the 1920s. 
Staunch Republicans Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover served as Presi-
dent from 1921 to 1932. Hoover finally nominated Cardozo in the waning months of his presi· 
dency. See Carmen, supra note 5, at 616-44. Another possible explanation for Cardozo's change 
was that it resulted from his becoming Chief Judge in 1927. His view of that job may have 
prompted him to seek to build consensus by accommodating the views of others. Some sensed 
this phenomenon in William Rehnquist after he became Chief Justice. See David O. Stewart, 
Reconsidering Rehnquist, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1988, at 40. 
106. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). 
107. A number of commentators have surveyed Posner's judicial opinions. See, e.g., George 
M. Cohen, Comment, Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of the Law: The View 
From the Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1117 (1985); Samuels & Mercuro, supra note 30; James G. 
Wilson, Constraints of Power: The Constitutional Opinions of Judges Scalia, Bork. Posner, Easter-
brook and Winter, 40U. MIAMI L. REV. 1171, 1217-47 (1986); Larry L. Chubb, Note, Economic 
Analysis in the Courts: Limits and Constraints, 64 IND. L.J. 769 (1989). The authors generally 
conclude that economic analysis and language appear with some regularity in Posner's judicial 
opinions, but not nearly as frequently as in his extrajudicial writing. See, e.g., Chubb, supra, at 
800-01. 
108. 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1983). 
109. 697 F.2d at 769 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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enth Circuit to guide the trial judge's exercise of discretion, Posner 
would "consign to the verdict of the marketplace the issue of prisoner 
representation."110 Posner's position was rejected by the court that 
day, and it has not prevailed since.111 
Similarly, in 1986 Posner was asked to consider the appropriate 
standard for a trial judge to use when ruling on a request for a prelimi-
nary injunction. Posner responded, "P x Hp > (1-P) x Hd."112 For 
readers who were not up to the task of translating this algebraic 
formula, he explained that an injunction should issue: 
only if the harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is denied, multiplied by 
the probability that the denial would be an error (that the plaintiff, in 
other words, will win at trial), exceeds the harm to the defendant if the 
injunction is granted, multiplied by the probability that granting the in-
junction would be an error. 113 
This, according to Posner, is the "procedural counterpart" to Learned 
Hand's "famous negligence formula" that is now a conventional short-
hand for the economic approach to determining whether a defendant 
acted negligently.114 Posner emphasized that his approach was "not 
offered as a new legal standard," but represented "just a distillation of 
the familiar . . . test that courts use in deciding whether. to grant a 
preliminary injunction."115 It was "intended not to force [judges] into 
110. 697 F.2d at 769 (Cudahy, J., concurring). 
111. Market analysis was mentioned, but not made dispositive, in a later concurring opinion 
by fellow judge and kindred economist Frank Easterbrook. See Darden v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 
797 F.2d 497, 505 (7th Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit flatly rejected Posner's economic analysis 
of indigent litigation. In re Epps, 888 F.2d 964, 968 (2d Cir. 1989). 
112. American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
113. American Hosp., 780 F.2d at 593. 
114. American Hosp., 780 F.2d at 593; see United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (stating that a defendant is negligent when the burden of 
avoiding an accident (B) is less than the likelihood of the accident occurring (P) multiplied by the 
seriousness of the accident if it were to occur (L)). Judge Hand's approach has found acceptance 
in tort law because it captures the balancing enterprise that is central to the context-specific 
determination of reasonable care in the circumstances. But the theory offers little improvement 
on the more conventional balancing of factors prescribed by the REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§§ 291-293 (1965), and its persistence owes much to Posner's insistent championing of the 
formula as a paradigm example of how economics can inform the analysis of nonmarket issues. 
See, e.g., David v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1986); Llaguno v. 
Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1564 (7th Cir. 1985); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska 
Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1982); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 
F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1982); RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND EcONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 1-9 (1982) (chapter 1 is entitled ''The Learned Hand Formula for Determining Liabil-
ity," and includes a frontispiece picture of Judge Hand); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negli-
gence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972). More recently, Posner's cheerleading for the Hand 
formula has become somewhat less insistent. See McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc. 826 F.2d 1554, 
1557 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Conceptual as well as practical difficulties in monetizing personal injuries 
may continue to frustrate efforts to measure expected accident costs with ..• precision .•.. 
[J]uries may be forced to make rough judgments of reasonableness, intuiting rather than measur-
ing the factors in the Hand Formula."). 
115. American Hosp., 780 F.2d at 593. 
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a quantitative straitjacket" but rather to direct attention to the rela-
tionship among factors relevant to the central question: the risk of 
error.116 The dissenting judge rejected Posner's modest characteriza-
tion and emphasized the importance of the flexibility traditionally ex-
ercised when a judge considers whether to grant a preliminary 
injunction. 117 Subsequent panels of the Seventh Circuit damned the 
algebraic formula with faint praise, 118 emphasized its substantive and 
procedural links to traditional doctrine, 119 and criticized the supposed 
precision that it offered as being an inappropriate substitute for the 
trial judge's "intuitive sense about the nature of the case."120 No ap-
pellate judge, including Posner, has attempted actually to implement 
the formula mathematically. After an initial flurry of interest, this at-
tempt to interject "science" into the law has passed into the mist of the 
Seventh Circuit, and, with one modest exception, it has never been 
followed outside of Posner's court.121 
Posner has been more successful promoting economic analysis in 
cases involving market-oriented issues, such as antitrust, and in 
nonmarket cases, such as torts, in which a balancing of costs and bene-
fits is understandable, if not always discussed in an explicitly economic 
way.122 But when economics is an unlikely tool, Posner has failed to 
116. 780 F.2d at 593-94. The cost of erroneously denying an injunction increases with the 
magnitude of the harm the plaintiff will incur from denial and the probability that the plaintiff 
will eventually win at trial, and the cost of erroneously granting an injunction increases with the 
harm the defendant will incur from the grant and defendant's probability of eventually 
prevailing. 
117. Judge Swygert described Posner's formula as a "Homeric Siren," a "seductive but de-
ceptive security," that was ultimately antithetical to the flexible, imprecise nature of equitable 
decisionmaking. American Hosp., 780 F.2d at 610 (Swygert, J., dissenting). 
118. See, e.g., Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Arnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1434-35 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(Posner's formula is "effective shorthand" but, in analyzing preliminary injunctions, it is "impos-
sible to think in terms of a single correct result"; "[i]mplicit in equity's connection to the vague 
concept of fairness is a need for flexibility."). 
119. See Brunswick Corp. v. Jones, 784 F.2d 271, 274 n.1 (7th Cir. 1986). 
120. Lawson, 782 F.2d at 1436. 
121. American Elec. v. Singarayar, 530 So. 2d 1319, 1324 (Miss. 1988) (characterizing Pos-
ner's opinion as the "familiar balancing test ••• perceptibly explicated - and applied"). Not 
surprisingly, academics found Posner's proposal noteworthy, and articles on the subject quickly 
followed. See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, Injunctions by the Numbers: Less Than the Sum of Its 
Parts, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 279 (1987); Linda S. Mullenix, Burying (With Kindness) the Feli-
cific Calculus of Civil Procedure, 40 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1987). Both of these articles trace (and 
applaud) the general downward trajectory of Posner's formula. 
122. See Richard A. Posner, On Theory and Practice: Reply to ''Richard Posner's Praxis," 49 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1077, 1083 (1989) (summarizing the correspondence of his views with the antitrust 
decisions of the Supreme Court). Posner is, of course, not the only influential law and economics 
scholar to sit on the bench: Frank Easterbrook and Robert Bork have played roles at least as 
important as Posner in imposing efficiency-oriented considerations on antitrust and related mar-
ket fields. See William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characteri-
zation, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1228-57 (1989). 
Issues of procedural due process have also provided those so inclined with an opportunity to 
view legal problems through an economist's lens. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-
49 (1976); Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (advocat-
ing "a simple cost-benefit test of general applicability"). As with much economic analysis of 
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convince others of the wisdom of his all-encompassing world view. 
This is not to say that Posner has been uninfiuential on the bench. To 
the contrary, his judicial opinions are cited by other judges very fre-
quently, and his analyses and outcomes are more or less consistent 
with the rightward tilt of the federal courts as a result of Ronald Rea-
gan's and George Bush's appointments.123 
Posner has been decidedly more effective when he hews to more 
traditional methods of deciding cases. A good example of this is the 
line of Posner opinions in civil rights cases beginning with Bowers v. 
De Vito. 124 In Bowers, one Vanda had been found not guilty of murder 
by reason of insanity and was committed to a public mental health 
facility. Vanda was released from custody and one year later he killed 
a young woman. Her administrator filed a wrongful death action 
against the various public defendants, alleging that the reckless release 
violated section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for the defendants, relying 
upon a recent Supreme Court decision, Martinez v. California, 125 that 
had held that because five months had passed between the negligent 
release and the murder, notions of proximate cause precluded govern-
ment liability.126 After Martinez, it would seem that the one-year gap 
in Bowers would have made a per curiam affirmance of the trial judge 
the almost certain outcome. Posner, however, saw in the case some-
thing more, and, out of the clay of a relatively straightforward dam-
ages action, he molded a global theory of the Constitution. 
[T]here is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against 
being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state 
fails to protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, 
any other provision of the Constitution. The Constitution is a charter of 
legal issues, the due process calculus is long on technique but short on questions of value. See 
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process CO/cu/us for Administrative Adjudication in 
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value. 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 
(1976). 
123. See Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, Note, All the President's Men? A Study of 
Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 766 (1987); 
Marcia Coyle, The Judiciary: A Great Right Hope, NATL. LJ., Apr. 18, 1988, at 22. 
Frank Easterbrook has argued that the Supreme Court's decisions increasingly reflect an 
economist's ex ante perspective. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term -Fore-
word: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 10-14, 19-42 (1984). If this is 
to say that the Court is unwilling to yield reflexively to claims based upon justice and other 
inefficient normative notions, he surely is right. See Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: 
Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARv. L. REV. 592, 598 (1985) (stating that Court 
opinions "insensitive to constitutional concerns bearing on the distribution of wealth and power'' 
may be based on "substantive judgments" that are merely masked by a "cost-benefit patina"). 
124. 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982). 
125. 444 U.S. 277 (1980). 
126. 444 U.S. at 285 ("[W)e do hold that at least under the particular circumstances of this 
parole decision, appellants' decedent's death is too remote a consequence of the parole officers' 
action to hold them responsible under the federal civil rights law."). 
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negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require 
the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elemen-
tary a service as maintaining law and order.127 
This notion of "negative liberties" is not entirely new; the reluc-
tance of the Supreme Court to impose upon government an affirmative 
constitutional obligation to provide services dates back at least to San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 128 The Bowers opin-
ion, however, represented a bold foray into constitutional theorizing 
by a relatively new federal judge.129 
Posner's constitutional theory was thereafter discussed by noted 
scholars, 130 and ultimately given the imprimatur of the Supreme Court 
in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. 131 
Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted the negative rights analysis in toto. 132 
The Rehnquist-Posner view is that the Bill of Rights is only a charter 
of negative liberties, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no 
affirmative obligations upon the states. This negative liberties ap-
proach may well misread the history of the amendment, which was 
intended to interpose the federal government into the process by 
127. Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618. Judge Wood dissented on the grounds that Bower's appeal 
had been decided without benefit of oral argument and without considering the possibility that 
Martinez could be limited to claims against parole officials, as opposed to medical defendants. 
686 F.2d at 619 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
128. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, a narrow majority of the Court, including all of Rich-
ard Nixon's appointees, effectively killed "fundamental rights" analysis under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which had previously been read to require governments to provide certain minimal 
services to all citizens. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LA w 
§§ 16-35, 16-40 (1988). 
129. Less than a year after Bowers, Posner expanded upon his constitutional theory. In Jack-
son v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984), he 
observed: . 
[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties. The men who wrote 
the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the people but 
that it might do too much to them. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868 at the 
height of laissez-faire thinking, sought to protect Americans from oppression by state gov-
ernment, not to secure them basic governmental services. Of course, even in the laissez-faire 
era only anarchists thought the state should not provide the type of protective services at 
issue in this case. But no one thought federal constitutional guarantees or federal tort reme· 
dies necessary to prod the states to provide the services that everyone wanted provided. 
[Proposals that find in the Fourteenth Amendment a right to basic government services] 
would be more than an extension of traditional conceptions of the due process clause. It 
would tum the clause on its head. It would change it from a protection against coercion by 
state government to a command that the state use its taxing power to coerce some of its 
citizens to provide services to others. 
715 F.2d at 1203-04. 
130. David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 
(1986); Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmatfre 
Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330 (1985). 
131. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
132. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. Interestingly, Posner wrote the lower court opinion in 
DeShaney. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 
1987). His opinion there summarizes the negative rights arguments he had previously made in 
Jackson and Bowers. See DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 301. 
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which states determined how to spend their resources;133 worse, such 
an interpretation may provide a temptingly talismanic answer to com-
plex questions. 134 But bad law or not, this is now the law of the land. 
Why was Posner able to prevail in the marketplace of legal ideas 
with a fresh articulation of constitutional theory while failing, even in 
his own circuit, to revise the rules controlling appointment of counsel 
for indigents or the granting of preliminary injunctions? There are 
several possible explanations. First, in his early years on the bench, 
while still full of an academic's sense of invincibility, Posner proposed 
law and economics solutions to problems perfectly addressable by fa-
miliar legal tools, such as the factors that courts have looked to for 
generations when deciding whether to grant injunctive relief. Judges 
would not accept Posner's proposals because they believed that what 
Posner added was wrong (if it was intended to change the law) and 
superfluous (if it was not). 135 Second, his proposals were dressed in 
unfamiliar terms, especially the algebraic formula, and the resistance 
from judges not trained in economics was predictable.136 Both of 
these phenomena reflect Posner's naivete about the nature of the judi-
ciary as he began his service in the early 1980s. The reluctance of 
judges to embrace high theory, let alone numeric reductionism, no 
doubt came as a surprise to Posner after a decade of helping set the 
agenda in the academy. On the other hand, his negative rights ap-
proach to the Constitution was supported by (one version of) history, 
required no "insider's" expertise to evaluate or implement, and was 
timed perfectly to fit with a narrowing vision of the role of the federal 
courts vis-a-vis the states that had come into full flower in the 1980s. 
D. Posner the Persona on Cardozo the Persona 
Posner tells us that Cardozo has been termed a "saint," a status 
derived from the "gentleness, modesty, tact, considerateness, mildness, 
circumspection, judiciousness, and moderation of the Cardozo per-
sona. "137 Cardozo was generous in his praise of others and worked 
133. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Nega-
tive Rights View of the Constitution, 43 V AND. L. REV. 409 (1990); David A. Logan, Judicial 
Federalism in the Court of History, 66 OR. L. REv. 453 (1987). 
134. Currie, supra note 130, at 887. 
135. See American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 609-10 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (Swygert, J., dissenting). 
136. 780 F.2d at 610 (Swygert, J., dissenting) ("[Posner's] formula invites members of the 
Bar to dust off their calculators and dress their arguments in quantitative clothing. The resulting 
spectacle will perhaps be entertaining, but I do not envy the district courts of this circuit and I 
am not proud of the task we have given them."). 
137. P. 8. One of Cardozo's former law clerks, Paul Freund, has recounted a good example 
of Cardozo's humility. 
Cardozo was allergic to super-sophistication or pretentiousness. The law clerk, imbued with 
the brave new insights of sociological jurisprudence, saw his chance to have those insights 
confirmed. "When you voted as you did in the Palsgraf case," he inquired of the Justice, 
"you did so, didn't you, because you thought that was a sound allocation of social costs?" 
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effectively with his fellow judges, only rarely offering dissent to their 
opinions (pp. 8, 120-21, 130). He had no strong political agenda and 
recognized the advantages of moderation in a judge: "Cardozo was an 
incrementalist working primarily in an incremental medium, the com-
mon law" (p. 126). Cardozo took pains to avoid appearing the "osten-
tatious liberal" (p. 121). 
Also contributing to Cardozo's reputation was the close relation-
ship he cultivated with academics. His relatives served on the board of 
Columbia University, 138 and, after serving on the state bench for only 
eight years, he was asked to give the Storrs Lectures at Yale Law 
School. This series of four speeches on his judicial philosophy later 
became The Nature of the Judicial Process. 139 The success of these 
lectures paved the way for additional appearances in the academy and 
resulting extrajudicial writings.140 Cardozo peppered these works and 
his judicial opinions with frequent and flattering references to the 
work of legal academies (p. 132), paying close attention to those who 
could enhance his reputation. And yet, he attempted to make his writ-
ing, and especially his judicial opinions, convey to the larger commu-
nity the norms that animated the common law.141 
Cardozo was lucky, and this, too, made a difference. He was able 
to serve on the high court of the most populous state when both the 
court and the state were at the zenith of their influence.142 His an-
tiformalist philosophy coincided with the realist positions that were 
beginning to gain favor, and the common law issues that were the sta-
ple of this court's caseload were perfectly suited to his judicial ap-
proach.143 His colleagues on the New York Court of Appeals were 
generally of like mind. While his Washington years were not his best, 
the opportunity to serve on the Supreme Court was, at least profes-
sionally, a matter of good fortune. 144 
Finally, Cardozo was a very hard worker. He had few outside in-
The Justice put on a look of wide-eyed innocence. "Why no," he said, "I voted as I did in 
Palsgraf because I thought that was what the law was." 
Paul A. Freund, Foreward: Homage to the Mr. Justice Cardozo, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (1979). 
138. WHITE, supra note 5, at 254. 
139. Id. at 256. Cardozo first turned down the invitation, protesting that he had nothing 
useful to say. White terms this reflective of "a certain coyness." Id. For a more sympathetic 
view of the events leading up to the Yale lectures, see Bricker, supra note 5, at 23 n.112. 
140. WHITE, supra note 5, at 259. 
141. See Goldberg, supra note 26, at 1348. 
142. P. 129. As Cardozo put it in his typically modest manner, "I do not know how it will 
all end. I know that it has been an interesting time to live in, an interesting time in which to do 
my little share in translating into law the social and economic forces that throb and clamor for 
expression." Cardozo, supra note 47, at 45. 
143. Pp. 27-31. Posner contrasts Cardozo to Robert Jackson in this regard. "[Jackson's] 
experience in the upper echelons of government ..• [might have led him to consider] service on 
such a [common law] court one long snore." P. 141. 
144. Pp. 128-29; see also supra note 1. 
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terests and his dedication to his work was remarkable.145 Despite a 
random assignment system, Cardozo actually wrote more opinions 
than his state court colleagues and, despite poor health, continued to 
outpace the productivity of his colleagues on the Supreme Court.146 
Parallels between Cardozo and Posner are instructive. Both were 
sons of lawyers, born in New York City to politically active Jewish 
parents; both attended Ivy League Schools.147 Both were brilliant and 
bookish, 148 pursuing intellectual interests (including the Greek clas-
sics) outside of the technical confines of the law, 149 while attending to 
their professional responsibilities with great vigor.150 Both were well-
connected to influential reputers in the academy, and were skilled, if 
not always subtle, self-promoters.151 And, of course, both were pro-
lific writers. 152 
Posner, like Cardozo, has been lucky. His market-oriented ap-
proach to the law· coincided neatly with the supply side economics 
145. See Freund, supra note 137, at 3; Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., A Personal View of Justice Benja-
min N. Cardozo, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 5, 9-10 (1979). 
146. P. 86. Posner identifies Cardozo's writing of full rather than per curiam opinions as the 
reason for Cardozo's greater output on the Court of Appeals. P. 86. 
147. See supra note 1; Ranii, supra note 31, at 26. Posner's parents made young Richard 
donate his model train set to the newly-orphaned children of convicted spies Ethel and Julius 
Rosenberg. David Margolick, An Unusual Caurt Nominee, Judging by His Family, N.Y. TIMES, 
~~~-~ . 
148. Posner's Yale A.B. was granted summa cum /aude and his Harvard LL.B. magna cum 
/aude. Justice William Brennan characterized Posner as one of only two "authentic geniuses" he 
had met in his lifetime. (The other was William 0. Douglas.) Ranii, supra note 31, at 26. On his 
part, Cardozo graduated from Columbia College with the highest scholastic record in its history, 
SIDNEY H. AsCH, THE SUPREME CoURT AND ITS GREAT JUDGES 147 (1971), and one of his 
clerks likened his job to being "clerk to an encyclopedia." Freund, supra note 137, at 3. 
149. See POSNER, JURlSPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 9; POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, 
supra note 18, at 110-12 (exemplifying Posner's interest in the classics); DREW PEARSON & ROB-
ERT s. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 220 (1936) (noting that Cardozo would often wake up 
before 6 a.m. and read Greek). Posner's recent opinion in Miller v. South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 
1089-104 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) is a tour de force of displayed erudition. En 
route to striking down an ordinance that criminalized nude dancing, Posner discussed, inter alia, 
the history and psychology of erotic dance, bullfighting, cabarets, tone poems, Eliot, Shake-
speare, Titian, Holst, Strauss, Manet, Balthus, Balanchine, and Beardsley. 
150. Pp. 86-89. Posner has averaged 90 opinions a year while on the bench. In comparison, 
in 1990 Judge Easterbrook authored 73, while other high visibility Reagan appointees Ralph 
Winter, Roger Miner, Alex Kozinski, and Edith Jones authored 36, 27, 22, and 50, respectively. 
151. It has been reported that Posner provides his former Chicago colleagues with copies of 
his opinions, see Ranii, supra note 31, at 1, and on his own initiative provides the same service to 
other academics. See Weisberg, supra note 72, at 1605 n.31. A call to Judge Posner's chambers 
on January 21, 1992, yielded a copy of a 59-page curriculum vitae, updated to December 23, 
1991. Included are cites to every judicial opinion he has authored, including per curiam opin-
ions. 
Posner's concern with reputers is further exemplified by his frequent citations to authorities 
especially likely to impress an academic reader. In Market Street Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588 
(7th Cir. 1991), a nine-page opinion, Posner provided ten cites to five law review articles, seven 
cites to four treatises, two to the Restatement, two to Cardozo, and one each to Judges Friendly 
and Hand. 
152. Cardozo did not rely heavily upon law clerks to draft opinions; neither does Posner. See 
Freund, supra note 137, at 3;Ranii, supra note 31, at 26. 
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embraced by the Reagan Administration. This helped make him one 
of the new president's first nominees to the federal bench. During his 
first decade of service the Supreme Court became increasingly con-
servative. In large measure because of his efforts, and due to the re-
ceptivity of the high court to conservative outcomes, the Seventh 
Circuit's reputation has grown markedly.153 
Unlike Cardozo, however, Posner's luck may have begun to run 
out. Within a very short time after his appointment to the federal 
bench in 1981, Posner's name was being prominently discussed as 
Reagan's next nominee to the Supreme Court.154 By 1986, Posner was 
still "regularly mentioned,"I55 but the failed nomination of Robert 
Bork in 1987 appears to have derailed the Posner express. Bork 
presented an easy target for opponents because of his extensive writ-
ings on a broad range of controversial subjects, including race and 
abortion. I56 The crucifixion of Bork in the political process convinced 
the White House to select a nominee "less controversial or doctrinaire 
than Bork."I57 In this changed environment, Posner was viewed as 
too risky.I58 Similar concerns afilicted George Bush's consideration of 
replacements for William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall; less ideol-
ogy was needed - or at least less of a paper trail - and Posner's 
prospects were dashed. I59 
153. Noreen Marcus, Rule of Law (and Economics), AM. LAW., June, 1988, at 38. 
154. Ranii, supra note 31, at 1 (Posner "at the top of most lists"); Kathleen Sylvester, Fertile 
Ground for the Supreme Court, NATL. L.J., May 9, 1983, at 24 (Posner the most likely 
candidate). 
155. John Riley, Has Judge Posner Gone Too Far?, NATL. L.J., Sept. 1, 1986, at 3. 
156. BORK, supra note 54, at 268-349; ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE 
BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (1989); MICHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY SCHAETZEL, 
THE PEOPLE RlsING: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BORK NOMINATION (1989). 
157. Kenneth Karpay, Many Wait in Wings To Be Bork's Understudy, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 
12, 1987, at 2. 
158. Id.; see also Roth, supra note 36, at 32 (Posner is "Bork in spades"). 
159. See Fred Barnes, Weirdo Alert, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1991, at 7 (Clarence Thomas is 
confirmable because he lacks a significant paper trail while Posner is not confirmable because he 
has one). Interestingly, in the years since Bork's defeat, Posner's intellectual independence has 
led him to take positions, both on and off the bench, that undoubtedly have damaged his pros-
pects with the conservatives in the White House who screen candidates for the Supreme Court. 
For example, in Miller v. South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concur-
ring), Posner voted to strike down an ordinance that criminalized nude dancing. His separate 
opinion explained why, contrary to the view of many blue noses, "low art" (like striptease) is just 
as expressive, and thus, just as deserving of protection under the First Amendment, as ballet or 
classical painting, adding for good measure that "(c]ensorship of erotica is pretty ridiculous." 
904 F.2d at 1100. 
Another example of Posner's intellectual independence comes from his recent review of a 
book describing the role of lawyers in Nazi Germany. Toward the end of the piece Posner 
writes: 
Our retention, indeed our expanding use, of capital punishment, our other exceptionally 
severe criminal punishments (many for intrinsically minor, esoteric, or archaic offenses), our 
adoption of pretrial detention (as a result of which some criminal defendants languish in jail 
for two years or more while awaiting trial), and our enormous prison and jail population 
(almost 1 million - close to one-half of one percent of the American population), mark us 
as the most penal of the civilized nations today. 
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Posner is different from Cardozo in one other important way. Car-
dozo was revered. His personal qualities of humility, compassion, and 
moderation are the stuff of legends. His leadership of his court earned 
the respect of his colleagues, lawyers, and academics. Upon his death, 
the law reviews at Columbia, Harvard, and Yale all published identi-
cal tributes provided by Harlan Stone, Learned Hand, Irving Lehman, 
Warren Seavey, Arthur Corbin, and Felix Frankfurter.160 A law 
school has been named after him, as have secondary schools. Cardozo 
was loved as well as respected in a way perhaps unmatched by any 
other figure in American law. Although he is far from having decided 
his last case or written his last book, Posner has no such favorable 
persona.161 
CONCLUSION 
Although by nature a very private person, Benjamin Cardozo lived 
a very public life. 162 More than half a century after his death, his 
career and works are still considered significant. Because of his prag-
matic jurisprudence, the breadth and depth of his writing, the sheen of 
his rhetoric, his solicitous relationship with reputers, his good luck, 
and his impeccable personal qualities, Cardozo's reputation is secure, 
as Posner's book shows. 
But what of Richard Posner himself? Many of these same qualities 
can be found in Posner, but a few critical ones cannot. The Richard 
Posner who came to the federal bench was the product of the acad-
emy. He thrived in the abstract and increasingly rough-and-tumble 
pages of academic journals, on occasion collaborating with others, but 
Posner continues: 
Perhaps in the fullness of time the growing of marijuana plants, the "manipulation" of 
financial markets, the sale of dirty magazines, the bribery of foreign government officials, the 
facilitating of suicide by the terminally ill, and the violation of arcane regulations governing 
the financing of political campaigns will come to be seen no more appropriate objects of 
criminal punishment than "dishonoring the race." Perhaps not; but Miiller's book can in 
any event help us to see that judges should not be eager enlisters in popular movements of 
the day .•.. 
Richard A. Posner, Courting Evil, NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1991, at 36, 41-42 (reviewing INGO 
MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE CoURTS OF THE THIRD REICH (1991)); see also Grady et al., 
supra note 36, § 3, at 3 (Posner proposes giving "legal recognition to homosexual cohabitation"). 
Posner has recently commented that the judicial selection process would be "extremely repul-
sive ..•• [Furthermore], I don't think there's a machinery for processing [all of my] writing 
through the Congressional intellect." Roth, supra note 36, at 32. 
160. See Tributes to Mr. Justice Cardozo, in 39 CoLUM. L. REv. 1-118, 52 HARV. L. REv. 
353-470, 48 YALE L.J. 371-488 (1939). Another outpouring of personal and professional trib-
utes to Cardozo may be found at 1 CARDOZO L. REv. 1-342 (1979). 
161. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 153, at 40 (noting that Posner does not have "the interper-
sonal skills to be [a] leader[]"); Martha Middleton, Shaping a Circuit in the Chicago School 
Image, NATL. L.J., July 20, 1987, at l, 35 (characterizing Posner as "intellectually aggressive-
some go so far as to say arrogant"); Ranii, supra note 31, at 26 (stating that it is not easy for some 
people to get along with Posner because "he [doesn't] know how to make his intellectual inferiors 
..• feel comfortable"). 
162. WHITE, supra note 5, at 255. 
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by and large walking the intellectual highwire by himself. With virtu-
ally no law practice under his belt, he was unprepared for the more 
collegial nature of the appellate bench and unfamiliar with the com-
mon sense, intuitions, and sense of moderation that inform the exper-
ienced lawyer and the pragmatic judge. At one point in Cardozo, 
Posner observes: 
[Holmes, Brandeis, Jackson, and Hand] are stronger judicial personali-
ties than Cardozo: more opinionated, more aggressive intellectually, 
more programmatic. Of all the great judges of his (approximate time) 
Cardozo is perhaps the most neutral, the most even, the most at home in 
the legal profession, the most comfortable insider: the most professional 
judge. [pp. 142-43] 
This surely does not describe the aggressive, doctrinaire Richard Pos-
ner of the early 1980s. 
But Posner wants to live the inspected life, 163 and there is evidence 
that he is changing, both in his judicial opinions and his extrajudicial 
writings, including Cardozo. The evolution of such a powerful intel-
lect bodes well for the bench and bar, the academy, and citizens alike. 
At one point, when extolling Cardozo's instinct for the pragmatic, 
Posner observes that "Cardozo was no Quixote" (p. 95). Perhaps a 
decade from now we will be able to say the same thing about Richard 
Posner. 
163. See, e.g., POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18: 
My last acknowledgment is to the late Paul Bator, who in a review of an earlier book of 
mine called me "a captive of a thin and unsatisfactory epistemology." I found this an arrest-
ing accusation and one with considerable merit, and it stimulated me to examine the 
problems of jurisprudence in greater depth than I had ever expected to. 
Id. at xiv (citation omitted). 
